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INTRODUCTION

While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers in a workable
government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence,
autonomy but reciprocity.

Justice Jackson'
Marc S. Mayerson, A.B., University of Michigan; J.D., Harvard Law School. Mr. Mayerson is a Law Clerk for Judge Stephen Reinhardt, U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninih Circuit. He
wishes to include the following acknowledgment:
I would like to thank Professors David Shapiro and Martha Minow of the Harvard Law
School, Professor Theodore Eisenberg of Cornell Law School, Rob Fram, and Howard Adler
for their much-needed and much-appreciated substantive and editorial help. They should not
be regarded, however, as contributing to any errors in this Article, for those would be mine
alone. I would also like to thank Amy Peck. This Article is dedicated to my parents.
1. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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The continuing controversy in United States v. Board of Education of the
City of Chicago 2 involves the desegregation of Chicago's school system and
has developed into a conflict of constitutional dimensions. Less than three
months before the 1980 presidential election, the Carter Administration
entered into a consent decree that contains what the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals later described as "a unique funding provision ...

that consti-

tutes an unprecedented settlement of a school desegregation claims by the
United States." 3 This funding provision obligates the United States to "make
every good faith effort" to provide funds to implement the court approved
desegregation plan 4 of the Chicago schools, the third largest system in the
country.' Since President Reagan assumed office in 1981, the Executive
Branch, with congressional acquiescence, has opposed implementation of the
United States' responsibilities under the decree. 6 Four years after the district
court first approved the consent decree, the Seventh Circuit observed "that
the process of dispute resolution has failed remarkably." ' 7 Part I describes
in detail the current conflict in the Chicago desegregation case between the
judiciary on the one hand, and the executive and legislative branches on the
other. This Article argues that the failure of the dispute resolution process
in that case should be attributed to the unconstitutional course of action
pursued by the political branches.
The theoretical analysis, parts II and III, addresses the issue of the coercive
enforceability of federal judicial decrees which reflects the tension in a
coordinated system of government power committed to maintaining an
independent judiciary. Part II examines the constitutional limitation on the
federal courts against the issuance of advisory opinions and develops the
concept of the executability of judgments. The section also explores the
judiciary's interest in executability as manifest in the problem of the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction from the Court of Claims. Part III discusses
the countervailing interests and powers of Congress in controlling the remedies granted by the federal courts. In particular, the section examines the
limitations on Congressional power to interfere with the role and function
of the federal judiciary through a post hoc modification of a judgment. Part
III also examines the conflict between the judicial and executive branches in
United States v. Nixon,8 and develops a parallel framework to examine a
dispute between the judiciary and Congress over the execution of a judgment.
Part IV concludes with an application of the analysis -to the continuing
constitutional conflict between the judiciary and the coordinate branches of
government in the Chicago case.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See infra note 9.
United States v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 744 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1984).
See id. at 1301 (quoting 15.1 of the consent decree).
United States v. Bd. of Educ., No. 80C 5124, slip op. at 41 (N.D. II1. Oct. 15, 1985).
See infra text accompanying notes 11-25.
744 F.2d at 1304.
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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I.

THE CONFLICT AMONG THE BRANCHES OF
GOVERNMENT IN THE CHICAGO

9

CASE

The scope of the Executive and Congressional power to modify the
execution of a court order is currently the central issue in the federal suit
to desegregate the Chicago school system. Less than three months before
the 1980 presidential election, the Department of Justice under the Carter

Administration entered into a consent decree with the Board of Education
of the City of Chicago (the "Board"), which obligated the United States to

"make every good faith effort to find and provide . . .financial resources

adequate for the implementation of the desegregation plan."' 0 After he
assumed office in 1981, President Reagan and the Congress attempted to

circumvent the decree by refusing to appropriate sufficient funding for its
implementation. "
Under the Seventh Circuit interpretation of the consent decree, the United

States must "go beyond assisting the Board in locating and applying for
federal funds and that [the decree] imposes a substantial obligation on the
government to provide funds to the board.' ' 2 While the Board has spent
more than $300 million to implement the court-approved desegregation
9. The Justice Department filed United States v. Bd. of Educ. on September 24, 1980.
The court had jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1345 (1982). On the
same day, the court approved a previously negotiated consent decree between the parties. The
court later denied intervention to the NAACP and MALDEF-PRLDEF, 88 F.R.D. 679 (N.D.
Ill. 1981). Two years later, the court approved the desegregation plan submitted by the parties.
554 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. III. 1983). On June 30, 1983, district court Judge Shadur ordered the
government to comply with the decree. In order to ensure the availability of monies to fund
the decree, the court restrained the Department of Education from spending appropriated
monies. 567 F. Supp. 272 (N.D. 111.
1983). The Seventh Circuit reviewed the actions of the
district court in freezing appropriated education funds, and sustained the preliminary injunction
but vacated and remanded the rest of the case. 717 F.2d 378 (7th Cir. 1983). On June 8, 1984,
the district court once again held that the government's refusal to fund the decree constituted
"bad faith," and granted the Board of Education monetary relief. 588 F. Supp. 132 (N.D. 111.
1984) (findings of fact and conclusions of law); 592 F. Supp. 967 (N.D. 111.
1984) (supplenent
to remedial order). On an expedited appeal, the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's
opinion, tentatively approved the priority funding plan of the United States, and remanded the
case to a different district court judge. 744 F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court
denied the petition for certiorari. 105 S. Ct. 2358 (1985). On remand, the federal district court
has disposed of the government's claim of privilege regarding certain documents, 610 F. Supp.
695 (N.D. I11.
1985), and denied the government's motion to vacate a preliminary injunction
to preserve the status quo. 610 F. Supp. 702 (N.D. Ill. 1985). On October 15, 1985, the district
court held that the government had continued to evade its responsibilities under the decree and
ordered permanent relief. No. 80C 5124, slip op. (N.D. II. Oct. 15, 1985) [hereinafter cited as
Chicago]. For other commentary on this case, see Devins and Stedman, New Federalism in
Education: The Meaning of the Chicago School Desegregation Cases, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1243 (1984) (giving detailed history of the case and exploring its importance in light of the
history and present policy of education funding for desegregation).
10. See Chicago, 744 F.2d 1300, 1304 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting 15.1 of the consent decree).
11.See infra text accompanying notes 15-22.
12. Chicago, 717 F.2d 378, 383 (7th Cir. 1983).
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plan,"3 the federal government, according to the district court, has consistently evaded its complementary responsibilities.
On June 30, 1983, citing the United States' noncompliance with its obligations under the decree, the district court restrained the Department of
Education from spending funds appropriated for other purposes in order to
ensure the availability of monies to fund the decree.' 4 In response to the
court's order, Congress passed a special resolution appropriating $20 million

to fund the decree."3 President Reagan, however, vetoed that supplemental
appropriation.' 6 In the veto message, President Reagan stated:
This veto is not premised on a desire to protect the Federal budget. It is
based upon my conviction that the Constitution and its process of separated
powers and checks and balances does not permit the judiciary to determine
spending priorities or to reallocate funds appropriated by Congress. Those
are exclusively the functions of the Legislative and Executive branches,
and the use of judicial decrees to assume such a power raises problems of
constitutional significance."

On September 21, 1983, Congressman Sydney Yates proposed the "Yates
Bill," which once again appropriated $20 million to fund the decree. The
Yates Bill was subsequently signed into law on October 1, 1983.18 The

appropriation, when compared to the expenditures made by the Board,
arguably falls far short of the obligations of the United States under the
consent decree.' 9 Moreover, on October 31, 1983, the President signed Public
Law 98-139 which, in a section proposed by Senator Lowell Weicker, § 309,
provided that:

13. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1985, § A, at 8, col. 6. The district court has noted

that these expenditures occurred during a period when the Board "was suffering severe financial
1984).
constraints and projecting a budget deficit." Chicago, 588 F. Supp. 132, 196 (N.D. 111.
14. Chicago, 567 F. Supp. 272, 289-90 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
15. On July 29, 1983, the House of Representatives agreed to amend H.R. 3069, Supplemental Appropriations, 1983. The amendment would have provided $20 million for Chicago
from available Guaranteed Student Loan funds. 129 CONG. REc. H5990-991 (daily ed. July
29, 1983). As the result of an enrolling error, the amendment was not included in the bill later
approved by the Senate and signed by the President. 129 CONo. REC. H6129 (daily ed. Aug. I,
1983). Congress passed H.J. Res. 338 to correct P.L. 98-63 and to provide $20 million to
Chicago. 129 CONG. REc. H6127, S11293 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1983).
16. Message to the House of Representatives Returning H.J. Res. 338 Without Approval,
19 WEEKLY COMPILATION PRES. Doc. 1133 (Aug. 13, 1983) (available on LEXIS).
17. Id. President Reagan is in historic company. For example, Thomas Jefferson wrote in
1804:
The judges, believing the [Sedition Law] constitutional, had a right to [judge the
casel ...because that power was placed in their hands by the Constitution. But
the Executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, was bound to remit the
execution of it; because that power has been confided to him by the Constitution.
8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 310 (1897). But see infra note 109.
18. Pub. L. No. 98-107, § I11, 97 Stat. 733, 742 (Oct. 1, 1983).
19. In its October 1985 opinion, the district court noted:
[Tihe level of funding adequate for full implementation of the Plan in school year
1984-85 would have been approximately $171.631 million. Of that amount, Board
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No funds appropriated in any act to the Department of Education for
fiscal years 1983 and 1984 shall be withheld from distribution to grantees
because of the provisions of the order [restraining monies] entered by
United States District Court for Northern District of Illinois on June 30,
1983.20

In effect, this provision was an attempt to release the funds that the district

court had restrained as a means of securing implementation of the consent
decree. The district court observed that "in street language, [the section]
seeks to unfreeze previously frozen funds." '2' Furthermore, part of the
legislative history of the Weicker Bill indicates that Congress may have
affirmatively intended to limit the funds available to the Board to the

previously appropriated $20 millionY
In an extensive June 1984 opinion that followed the passage of the

legislation, the district court dissolved the preliminary injunction freezing
the disbursement of education funds and, thus, did not reach the merits of

the constitutionality of the Weicker Amendment.

3

Nevertheless, the district

was able to budget approximately $67.773 million, leaving an increment of approximately $103.858 million that Board, despite its best efforts, was not able to fund
....[I]t can reasonably be assumed that approximately $171.631 million will be
necessary for adequate implementation of the Plan in subsequent school years,
including school year 1984-85.
Chicago, No. 80C 5124, slip op. at 104-05 (N.D. i1. Oct. 15, 1985) (finding of fact # 265B).
20. Pub. L. No. 98-139, § 309, 97 Stat. 871, 895 (Oct. 31, 1983).
21. Chicago, 588 F. Supp. 132, 231 (N.D. I1. 1984) (footnote omitted). The Weicker
Amendment does express legitimate Congressional concern. Due to the district court's order,
which restrained education monies, third party applicants were prevented from receiving those
appropriated funds. As a result, many of the education lobby groups suggested and supported
the language of the Weicker Amendment as originally proposed (legislative ceiling) and subsequently enacted. Interview with Amy M. Peck, Legislative Assistant for Council of Chief State
School Officers, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 13, 1984) (on file in DEPAUL LAw REviEw Office).

22. The original language of the relevant section included the following provision: "No
funds appropriated in any Act ...other than those [already) appropriated by [the Yates Bill)
shall be available to fund the consent decree between the United States and the Board of
Education of the City of Chicago." Chicago, 744 F.2d at 1308 n.12; 129 CONG. REC. S13506
(daily ed., Oct. 4, 1983). The government has advanced this interpretation of Congressional
intent in this case. 744 F.2d at 1304. The district court held that the creation of such a legislative
ceiling constituted a "bad faith" violation of the United States' obligation under the consent
decree. Although the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's opinion on other grounds, see
infra text accompanying notes 26-27, it did indicate that the statute could be a "possible bad
faith violation of ... the Decree." 744 F.2d at 1308 n.12. Thus, the appellate court, in its
remand, directed the district court to examine whether the new law would prevent Congress
from appropriating any additional monies in excess of the $20 million previously provided by
the Yates Bill. Id.
23. Chicago, 588 F. Supp. at 233-34 (conclusion of law # 103). Judge Aspen, the new
district court judge assigned to the case, agreed with the analysis of Judge Shadur, which he
quoted in his opinion:
[W]e are troubled that the statute reverses a particular judicial order in a particular
case .... As such, the statute very likely invades the judicial province and violates
fundamental constitutional principles of separation of powers .... We could hold

now that the statute (in all likelihood) is unconstitutional ....
Chicago, 610 F. Supp. at 711.
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. wholly fail to

meet its obligation to 'make every good faith effort' and constitute affirmative bad faith conduct and willful violations of the Consent Decree and
orders of this Court and the Court of Appeals." '2 4 The court relied on the
fact that the Executive Branch had opposed enactment of the Yates Bill and
had lobbied extensively for the passage of the Weicker language which, in
its view, specifically would make unavailable to the Board funds that previously had been restrained by the court.2" The district court ruled that the
United States had an unconditional obligation to provide
approximately $104
26
million to the Board for the 1984-85 school year.
The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court's opinion and remedial
order,2 7 but did not rule on whether that court had mistakenly construed the
government's actions as a bad faith attempt to undermine the decree. Rather,
the appellate court held that the district court judge had abused his discretion
in fashioning monetary relief by, inter alia, failing to consider the government's new plan to provide funds on a priority basis to the Board within
the regular competitive process of distribution of desegregation and educational grants.28
On October 15, 1985, the district court once again held that the United
States had failed in its obligations to the Board as required by the consent
decree. Judge Marvin Aspen, replacing Judge Shadur per order of the
appellate court, noted that a "remedial order would formally declare, inter
alia, that the United States violated the Decree by:
(a) failing to consider the Consent Decree in formulating its allocation
decisions with respect to the full amount of available fudns [sic] appropriated by Congress ...

for desegregation ....

(b) providing in 1984 zero funding in the [Secretary's] Discretionary
Fund [and only limited amounts in other funds].
(c) failing to provide the Board in 1984 the amounts now estimated to
represent its substantial share and the maximum level of available funding
(d) failing to take any step to provide the Board in 1984 the restrained
Excess Funds [available to the Secretary] ....
(e) failing entirely to conduct any affirmative search for funds that
could be used to advance the Board's Plan in fiscal year 1984 and prior
years, failing to provide any such funds, and conducting.grossly deficient
search activities in fiscal year 1985.29
The district court interpreted the Seventh Circuit's opinion limiting its
remedial powers as evincing a substantive concern that the national character

24. Chicago, 588 F. Supp. at 212 (finding of fact # 609).
25. Id. at 237.

26. Chicago, 744 F.2d at 1307.
27. Id. at 1308.

28. Id. at 1306-07.
29. Chicago, No. 80C 5124, slip op. at 278-79.
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of statutory programs should be protected. 0 Thus, while the Seventh Circuit
opinion "fundamentally shifted the battlefield from the pre-appropriation
to the post-appropriation landscape,"'" the district court ordered the United
States to provide the Board with approximately $17 million of "available"
funds.3 2 The court further noted that "each of the proposed elements of an
order ... stands on its own, as reflecting the proper implementation of the
Consent Decree in each instance, and is in addition supported as part of an
overall remedy for the United States' historical pattern of failure to comply." 33 Moreover, the court ruled that fiscal year 1985 was essentially "lost"
because of the government's actions.34 The district court noted the consistency
of the government's opposition to implementation of the decree, and tentatively held that the obligations of the government under the decree begin
with the 1985-86 school year, extending for a period of at least five years
with continuing supervision by the district court.3" In effect, the court ruled
that the government's actions since the approval of the consent decree in
1980 had essentially prevented any implementation of the decree to date.
Indeed, the court further noted:
[Tihis pattern of failure to comply arguably shows that the United States
has made every effort to minimize and to avoid its obligations under the
Consent Decree and the provision of funding to the Board. This pattern
of conduct could constitute a bad faith violation of the Consent Decree
....

[A]Il of the proposed provisions of this Court's Order . . . could,

as a supplemental matter, be grounded upon these bad faith violations.
Besides the overall pattern of conduct, certain particular actions could
constitute bad faith, such as the Yates-Weicker Activities .... the conduct
surrounding the excess funds .... and the woeful lack of search activities.6

Thus, the district court held that the Board was entitled to permanent
injunctive relief.37 This case will be appealed to the Seventh Circuit for the
third time.
The United States has not provided substantial funding to implement the
desegregation plan of the Chicago case. The language of the Weicker Amendment amounts to a Congressional declaration that it would ignore the district
court's preliminary injunction issued in order to secure compliance with the
decree. Additionally, the Weicker Amendment, according to the government's understanding of its legislative history, created a legislative ceiling
for the decree that would limit the ability of the court to implement the
court-approved desegregation plan. As the district court's most recent opinion
concludes, the pattern of action of the government in the period since
approval of the consent decree has effectively nullified the operation of the
decree for the past five years.
30. 744 F.2d at 1306; slip op. at 271.

31. Slip op. at 267.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.at
Id. at
Id.at
Id.
Id. at
Id.at

137, 279-83.
283.
282.
284.
287.
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The Seventh Circuit interpreted "good faith" in the decree as "impos[ing]
a substantial obligation on the government to provide funds to the Board." 38
The court's analysis of the case rings generally in contractual terms. The
contract-based interpretation has resulted in a five-year litigation involving
"three district court opinions of more than 500 pages and two trips to the
Court of Appeals with another one perhaps iminent." 3 9 This Article suggests
an alternative analysis based not on contract but on the constitutional status
of the court's interest in the executablity of judgments. Parts II and III
develop the concept of executability and examine the countervailing concerns
and powers of the coordinate branches regarding executability. Part IV then
applies the formulated doctrine of executability to the Chicago case and
argues that the pattern of conduct of the United States in this case has
violated the constitutional separation of powers.
II.

THE JUDICIARY'S INTEREST IN THE EXECUTIBILITY
OF ARTICLE III JUDGMENTS

A.

Advisory Opinions and the Judicial Power
Granted by Article III of the Constitution

Justice Holmes, in his essay Natural Law, observed that "[flor legal
purposes, a right is only the hypostasis of a prophecy-the imagination of
a substance supporting the fact that the public force will be brought to bear
upon those who are said to contravene it." 4 In the vindication of legal
rights, courts "dispense" the imaginary substance which directs the public
force in safeguarding those rights. Accordingly, from the internal view of
the judiciary, a court fails to function as a court when it intervenes in
matters for which it is unable to determine, by law or in fact, the binding
application of the public force.
Article III of the United States Constitution vests "the judicial Power of
the United States . . . in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as
the Congress may ... ordain and establish.""' According to Justice Johnson,
sitting as Circuit Justice in 1808, "[tjhe term 'judicial power' conveys the
idea, both of exercising the faculty of judging and of applying physical force
to give effect to a decision." '4' Because the only power granted to the federal
courts is the judicial power, 4 when a court is unable to exercise that power,

38. Chicago, 717 F.2d at 383. See also Chicago, 592 F. Supp. at 968 (United States is
obligated by contract).
39. Slip op. at 287.
40. Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARV. L. REv. 40, 42 (1918).
41. U.S. CONST. art. III, § I, cl. I.
42. Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston, 10 F. Cas. 355, 361 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No. 5,420).
For a chronicle of the Gilchrist ,case, one of the judiciary's early confrontations with the
executive branch, see II G. HASKINS & H. JOHNsON, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 298-305
(P. Freund ed. 1981).
43. See, e.g., Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 702 (1885) (posthumously published
opinion of Chief Justice Taney drafted in 1864), in which Chief Justice Taney stated, "[Nior
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intervention would exceed the constitutional role of the judiciary." Thus,

according to the Supreme Court in Flast v. Cohen, 45 article III courts have
developed the doctrine of justiciability, limiting judicial intervention "to
those disputes [1] which confine federal courts to a role consistent with a
system of separated powers; and [21 which are traditionally thought to be
capable of resolution through the judicial process.'4 6
The advisory opinion doctrine, "the oldest and most consistent" strand
of article III justiciability, 47 prohibits article III courts from exercising jurisdiction when judicial intervention would not effectuate the determinant
settlement of the controversy. 48 The duty of the federal courts, according to
Chief Justice Hughes in Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth4 9 is to "decide
actual controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect." 50 While
court utterances do not actually transform the physical world, when a court
enters a judgment-deciding the legal rights and obligations of the partiesthe public force will be brought to bear in enforcing the court's pronouncement.' Since real world changes usually occur after the actual issuance of
the judicial pronouncement, the judgment must be executable 2 in order for
that pronouncement not to be merely advisory regarding the court-ordained
outcome.
can Congress authorize or require this Court to express an opinion on a case where its judicial
power could not be exercised."
44. See generally Frankfurter, Advisory Opinions in I ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES
475 (Ist ed. 1930) (decision upon hypothetical fact situation interferes with function of Congress in Constitutional process of legislation).

45. 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
46. Id.at 97.
47. Id. at 96 (quoting C.

WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS 34 (1963)).
48. See, e.g., International Tel. and Tel. v. Alexander, 396 F. Supp. 1150 (D.Del. 1975)

(dismissed for want of jurisdiction). The court stated, "It should be noted that this conclusion
regarding the advisory nature of any opinion on the merits is entirely dependent upon the
Court's further conclusion that (the statutes at issue] .. .preclude the granting of injunctive
relief that would be necessary to effectuate any declaration of rights." Id.at 1161 n.26. See
also McKee v. Turner, 491 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1974) (cited in C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER,

& E. COOPER,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION

2d § 3529.1 n.13 (1984)) (no

justiciable controversy presented when defamation plaintiff seeks only apology, not damages);
City of Miami v. Sutton, 181 F.2d 644, 649 (5th Cir. 1950) (dismissed for want of jurisdiction
because legal impossibility of obtaining relief, renders declaration advisory).
49. 300 U.S. 227 (1937) (upholding constitutionality of the Declaratory Judgment Act). See
infra note 71.
50. Id. at 241.

51. See Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI.
Q. 470 (1923).
52. The fact that a judgment will be executed likens the rendering of judgment, as an
exercise of judicial power, to a speech act. A speech act is best illustrated by the example of a
baseball umpire calling a base runner out. By the fact that the umpire so spoke, the base runner
became "out"

for purposes of the game. Another common example is a promise. When I

promise something to someone, the verbal formulation conveys more than the mere intention
to make a promise; the spoken words themselves constitute the promise. Thus, the act of
promising is carried out by saying "I promise." A judgment is similar to a speech act in the
sense that it constitutes more than the mere assemblage of words; it is, in effect, an action

DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
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An advisory opinion would be the result in a controversy in which article
54
III judicial intervention would not be executable." Unlike an opinion,
executability relates to a judgment having legal effect by operation on the
rights of the parties." The doctrine of executability provides that the judgment "admit[s] of specific relief . . . of a conclusive character," 5 6 providing
a remedy for violation of legal right. Moreover, executability implies that a
judgment is an exercise of judicial power. "[T]o what purpose establish a
judiciary," Justice Johnson inquired in 1808, "with power to take cognizance
of certain questions of right, but not power to afford such redress as the
case evidently requires? ... The term 'power' [in article III itself] could
with no propriety be applied, nor could the judiciary be denominated a
accomplished by the rendering of the opinion. See, e.g.,
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

SEARLE,

"What is a Speech Act?" in

(J.R. Searle ed. 1971). Professor Searle describes the conditions

for the performance of a speech (illocutionary) act [substituting, here, the idea of, a legal
judgment for a promise]:
In the performance of an illocutionary act the speaker [the Judge] intends to
produce a certain effect by means of getting the hearer to recognize his intention
to produce that effect, and furthermore, if he is using words literally, he intends
this recognition to be achieved in virtue of the fact that the rules for using the
expressions he utters associate the expression with the production of that effect
....
Thus, each condition will be a necessary condition for the performance of
the act of [rendering judgment) and taken collectively the set of conditions will be
a sufficient condition for the act to have been performed.
Id. at 46-47 (emphasis added). The effect to be produced is the change in the world represented
by the judicial order. See also infra note 77.
53. The Supreme Court has essentially adopted this view as the rationale for the limitation
of its appellate jurisdiction from state courts to those cases without "independent and adequate"
state grounds. If the decision of the state court rests upon independent and adequate grounds,
the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to review the case. See, e.g., Herb v. Pitcairn, 324
U.S. 117, 125 (1945) (independent and adequate state ground doctrine reflects limitations of
Supreme Court jurisdiction). As Justice O'Connor noted in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032,
1040 (1983), "[r]espect for the independence of state courts as well as avoidance of rendering
advisory opinions, have been the cornerstones of this Court's refusal to decide cases where
there is an adequate and independent state ground." The Court noted further that the "jurisdictional concern is that we not 'render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment would
be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of federal laws, our review could
amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion."' Id. at 1042 (quoting Herb v. Pitcairn,
324 U.S. at 126). In the terms of this Article, such a result would not be executable.
54. Cf. United States v. Los Angeles R. Co., 273 U.S. 299 (1927) (reversing lower court's
assertion of jurisdiction of an administrative order by the Interstate Commerce Commission):
The so-called order here complained of is one which does not command the carrier
to do, or to refrain from doing, any thing; which does not grant or withhold any
authority, privilege, or license; which does not extend or abridge any power or
facility; which does not subject the carrier to any liability, civil or criminal; which
does not change the carrier's existing or future status or condition; which does not
determine any right or obligation. This so-called order is merely the formal record
of conclusions reached after a study of data .. ..
Id. at 309-10. (emphasis added).
55. Cf. North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (federal courts without power to
decide questions that cannot affect rights of litigants in case before them).
56. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Harworth, 300 U.S. 227, 241 (1937).
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7
department of government, without the means of enforcing its decrees."
Thus, the executability doctrine reflects the inherent tension within article
III as a limitation of power (no advisory opinions) and a grant of power
(independent authority of the judiciary).

B. Executability and Article III Power: The Court of Claims Problem
The Supreme Court has never fully resolved the issue of the limits to the.
executability of article III judgments," although the Court has struggled
with the related problem of its appellate jurisdiction from the Court of
Claims.5 9 An analysis of the evolution of the Court's view of the constitutional status of that court highlights its understanding of the judicial interest
in executability.
Under the act creating the Court of Claims in 1855, 60 Congress created a
forum for adjudicating claims against the United States. This act, however,
did not authorize the Court of Claims to render "final" judgments. 6' Under
the Court of Claims Act, the Treasurer of the United States and the Congress
could redetermine the merits of a decision against the United States in that

57. Gilchrist v. Collector of Charleston, 10 F. Cas. 355, 361 (C.C.D.S.C. 1808) (No. 5,420)
(sitting as Circuit Justice). See supra note 42.
58. See, e.g., Mishkin, Federal Courts as State Reformers, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 949,
969 n.73 (1978). Mishkin noted that "when the issue of whether litigation against the United
States could constitute a 'case or controversy' within Article Ill was considered, though a key
element of doubt was the lack of coercive enforceability of orders against the United States,
the Supreme Court always has resolved the issue of justiciability without declaring that the
judicial orders could be enforced without congressional concurrence." Id.
59. The Supreme Court has also examined this question in regard to territorial courts and
the courts established by Congress in the District of Columbia. See, e.g., Postum Cereal Co.
v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693 (1927) (dismissed appeal from District Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia's "administrative" or non-article Ill decision). The Court stated:
In the exercise of such function [the District Court of Appeals] does not enter a
judgment binding parties in a case as the term case is used in the third article of
the Constitution ....

[In prior cases] appeal was denied because the action of the

Court of Appeals was not a final judgment. This reason was a true one, but it
should not be understood to imply that, in such a proceeding, circumstances might
give it a form that would make it a final judgment subject to review by this Court.
Id. at 699 (emphasis added). See generally Katz, Federal Legislative Courts, 43 HARV. L. REV.
894 (1930).
60. Court of Claims Act, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612 (1855).
61. See Pocono Pines Assembly Hotels Co. v. United States, 73 Ct. Cl. 447, 467 (1932), in
which the court stated, "The term 'judgment' is not used in the [Court of Claims] act, and
obviously it was carefully prepared with a view of the nonsurrender by Congress of its legislative
power over claims ...

against the Government." For commentary on the Pocono Pines case

in which Congress in effect remanded the final judgment of a federal court, see Sloss, Mandamus
in the Supreme Court Since the Judiciary Act of 1925, 46 HARV. L. REV. 91, 114-17 (1932),
and Note, The Court of Claims: Judicial Power and Congressional Review, 46 HARV. L. REV.
677 (1933). For a more recent example, see United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S.
371 (1980). See also Ross v. United States ex rel Prospect Hill Cemetery, 8 App. D.C. 32 (1896)
(examining congressional remand in the District of Columbia's courts).
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court. In the 1864 case of Gordon v. United States'62 the Supreme Court
dismissed for want of jurisdiction an appeal brought pursuant to the act,
thus nullifying the provision providing for Supreme Court review. Gordon
was only the fourth time in the Supreme Court's history that the Court
invalidated a Congressional enactment. 63 Nonetheless, there was no opinion
issued in the Gordon case in 1864; 64 two reports of the Court's decision,
however, have survived. One report, United States v. Jones,6 claims that in
announcing the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Chase, having recently
succeeded Chief Justice Taney, stated that the statutory authority of the
Treasurer and the Congress to revise the decisions of the Court of Claims
"denies to [that tribunal] the judicial power, from the exercise of which
alone appeals can be taken to this Court. The reasons'6swhich necessitate this
conclusion may be more fully announced hereafter.
The second source, published in an appendix to the U.S. Reporter in 1885,
67
was the draft opinion that Chief Justice Taney had written in Gordon.
6
Taney died before he could have the other Justices approve his opinion. 1
This is the opinion to which Chase's statement that the "reasons which
necessitate this conclusion may be more fully announced hereafter" refers. 69
According to Chief Justice Taney, the grant of appellate jurisdiction act was
unconstitutional because the Court of Claims was not vested with article III
power. Taney, in summarizing the importance of executability to the
very definition of article III power, argued as follows:
The award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every judgment
passed by a court exercising [article Ill] judicial power. It is no judgment,
in the legal sense of the term, without it. Without such an award the
judgment would be inoperative and nugatory, leaving the aggrieved party
without a remedy. It would be merely an opinion, which would remain a
dead letter, and without any operation upon the rights of the parties,
unless Congress should at some future time sanction it, and pass a law
authorizing the court to carry its opinion into effect. Such is not the judicial
power ....
Because the Court of Claims lacked power to issue final judgments, the
62. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864) (dismissed for want of jurisdiction) (opinion of Chief
Justice Taney posthumously published in Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1885)).
63. VI C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 52 (P. Freund
ed. 1971).
64. 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864).
65. 119 U.S. 477 (1886).66. Id. at 478.
67. 117 U.S. 697 (1885).
68. See W. COWEN, P. NICHOLS, & W. BENNET, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS: A
HISTORY PART II 24 n.77 (1978).
69. 119 U.S. at 478.
70. 117 U.S. at 702 (emphasis added). Some courts have argued that Taney's position was
unnecessary to the holding of Gordon, but the same courts do not necessarily address or refute
his position. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 569 (1962) (citing United States
v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477, 478 (1886)). Other courts have either accepted Taney's opinion as the
holding of the case or agree with his conception of the nature of article 111 power. See, e.g.,
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Supreme Court could not accept jurisdiction, for to have done so would
have exceeded its own grant of constitutional authority. 7 ' Subsequent to the
Gordon case, Congress amended the Court of Claims act and withdrew the
District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62, 65 (1901) (Harlan, J.); National Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 652 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). In Northern
Pipeline Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), Justice Brennan cited Interstate
Commerce Comm. v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 484 (1894), quoting the first two sentences of
the language from Taney's opinion reproduced in the text. 458 U.S. at 86 n.38. Cf. Denny v.
Mattoon, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 361, 378, 79 Am. Dec. 784, 790 (1861). The Denny court stated,
"It is the exclusive province of courts of justice to apply established principles to cases within their
jurisdiction, and to enforce their decisions by rendering judgments and executing them by suitable
process." Id. As to the merits of Taney's claim that what we mean by something being a
legal judgment entails the application of the power of execution, cf. L. WrrrGENSTEIN,
PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (1953):
If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only
in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments (in the non-legal
sense]. This seems to deny logic, but does not do so. - It is one thing to describe
methods of measurement, and another to state the results of measurement. But
what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of
measurement.
Id. at § 242 (emphasis added).
71. 117 U.S. at 706. Taney's language in Gordon seemed to trouble some commentators
who were proponents of declaratory judgments, because there was no formal "award of
execution" for "declaratory" relief. The Supreme Court, however, in upholding the constitutionality of the Declaratory Judgment Act as consistent with the limitations on the judicial
power in article III in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937), stated the
prerequisites to the exercise of jurisdiction to issue a declaratory judgment:
The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching the legal relations of
parties having adverse legal interests . . . . It must be a real and substantial controversy . . . as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be
upon a hypothetical state of facts . . . . Where there is such a concrete case admitting of an immediate and definitive determination of the legal rights of the parties
in an adversary proceeding upon the facts alleged, the judicial function may be
appropriately exercised although the adjudication of the rights if the litigants may
not require the award of process or the payment of damages.
Id. at 240-41 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). A declaratory judgment is a judgment
in the legal sense in that the declaration of rights constitutes a sufficient remedy in the
circumstance presented. See, e.g., South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966)
(ruling that accepting jurisdiction would not result in an advisory opinion because "[an
appropriate remedy is a judicial determination that continued suspension of the new rule is
unnecessary to vindicate rights guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment").
The prevailing view since Aetna, however, interprets that case as implying that executability
is not a necessary quality of article Il power, and, more specifically, that Taney's thesis in
Gordon is either aberrant or troublesome. See, e.g., R. WOLFSON & P. KURLAND, ROBERTSON
AND KIRKHAM'S JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

§ 241 n.18 (1951);

A. MILLER, & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2d
§ 3529.1 (1984) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. The developments leading up to Aetna,
C.

WRIGHT,

according to one such commentator, laid "Taney's ghost" to rest. R. HARRIS, THE JUDICIAL
POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 54 (1940). This view generally begins with the a priori assumption that Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792) (advisory opinion), and Taney's position
in Gordon "are two distinct sources, of widely different importance and validity ....
Gordon
... introduced a deviant theme that caused trouble while it endured." WRIGHT & MILLER,
§ 3529.1 at 303 (1984). Taney's position, according to this view, was "never an accurate reflection of the full range of judicial business, [and] has now largely vanished." Id.
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revisory power of the Treasurer." The Supreme Court, thereafter, accepted
appellate jurisdiction."

The constitutional status of the Court of Claims remained unclear until
the 1962 case of Glidden Co. v. Zdanok.7 4 In Glidden, the question of
whether the Court of Claims was a full article III court entered the case
indirectly. Glidden was not heard in the Court of Claims. However, one of
that court's judges, by designation of the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, had heard the case in the Second Circuit. The petitioners argued in
the Supreme Court that because the Court of Claims was not an article III

court, the judge could not hear an article III case. Nine years before,
Congress had passed a statute purporting to vest the Court of Claims with
article III power,"' although the appropriations statute for payment of the
Court of Claims' judgments against the United States, the only defendant,
was limited to $100,000.76 While discussing the question of coercive enforceablity of orders against the United States-i.e. the absence of executability
which was fatal to the Gordon appeal-the plurality opinion argued that
"[i]f this Court may rely on the good faith of state governments or other

public bodies to respond to its judgments, there seems to be no sound reason
why the Court of Claims may not rely on the good faith of the United
States."7
For support, the conventional view notes, for example, the Supreme Court's opinion in Old
Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929), which stated that "it is not necessary,
in order to constitute a judicial judgment that there should be both a determination of the
rights of the litigants and also power to issue formal execution to carry the judgment into
effect, in the way that judgments for money or for the possession of land usually are enforced."
Id. at 725 (dicta for alternate holding) (emphasis added). Old Colony relies on Fidelity Nat'l
Bank & Trust v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123 (1927), for this proposition, which more fully articulates
the position of the Court. The Swope Court stated that naturalization proceedings, suits to
determine marital status, bills to quiet title where there is adverse possession, interpleader in
regard to the stakeholder, and instructions to a trustee "are familiar examples of judicial
proceedings which result in an adjudication of the rights of litigants, although execution is not
necessary to carry the judgment into effect, in the sense that no damages are required to be
paid or acts to be performed by the parties." Id. at 132 (emphasis added). In other words, the
mere declaration by the court would be a self-executing alteration of the rights and obligations
of the parties. The view expressed in Swope is thus consistent with the proposition that
executability of judgments is a requirement for article Ill adjudication. See also infra note 82.
72. 14 Stat. 9 (March 17, 1866) (repealing § 14).
73. See De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419 (1867).
74. 370 U.S. 530 (1962). See also Mishkin, supra note 58 (commenting on Glidden).
75. 67 Stat. 226 (1953), 28 U.S.C. 171.
76. Act of July 27, 1956, § 1302, 70 Stat. 678, 694, 31 U.S.C. § 724a.
77. 370 U.S. at 571. Cf. J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 237 (1971), in which Professor
Rawls states:
[Tjhe notion that ought implies can [- a necessary correlate of any legal system
-1 conveys the idea that those who enact laws and give orders do so in good faith.
Legislators and judges ... must believe that the law can be obeyed; and they are
to assume that any orders given can be carried out. Moreover, not only must the
authorities act in good faith, but their good faith must be recognized by those
subject to their enactments.
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Although the enforcement of judgments rendered in the Court of Claims
was limited to $100,000, the Supreme Court ruled that the Court of Claims

was, nevertheless, a full article III court. The Supreme Court did not suggest
that the Court of Claims could only exercise article III power until its annual
appropriation was depleted; rather, the Court announced a broader proposition: "We conclude that the presence of the United States as a party
defendant . .. does not debar ... courts from exercising the judicial power

provided for in Article III.

''7 s

Two preliminary conclusions are significant. First, when the United States

is a defendant in an article III court, the existence of that jurisdiction itself
must be, under the Flast v. Cohen analysis, "consistent with a system of
separated powers." ' 79 Second, for an article III court to exercise that juris-

diction and not render mere advisory opinions, any judgment entered against
the United States must be executable.
In Glidden, as in Gordon, the Court clearly thought that the judiciary

had a strong institutional interest in executability, a concern grounded in the
independence of the judicial branch. The effectiveness of the judicial check
on the other branches is dependent upon the finality and executability of
judgments within the judiciary's jurisdiction. 0 Nevertheless, the judiciary is

not the only governmental branch concerned with the finality of judgments.
While the Glidden Court felt that it could rely on the "good faith" of the
"Good faith" can also be understood in the context of a legal judgment being a speech
act. See SEARLE, supra note 52. Professor J.L. Austin described the contingencies regarding
effectuation of a speech act in the following manner: "[l~n consequence of the performance of
this [speech act/judgment), such-and-such a future event [e.g. execution), if it happens will be
in order, and such-and-such other events, if they happen [e.g. "bad faith" non-execution], will

not be in order." J.L.

AUSTIN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

27 (J.R. Searle ed. 1971)

(emphasis in original). In order for a judgment to be executable, the court must have the
constitutional authority to hear the claim. Compare Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) (President can ignore judgment of article IIl court only
if court not authorized to render judgment) with J.L. AUSTIN, supra, at 14, in which Professor
Austin wrote:
[The speech act] may be, as the lawyers say, "null and void." If, for example, the
speaker [the Judge] is not in a position to perform an act of that kind, or if the
object with respect to which he purports to perform it is not suitable for that
purpose [e.g. non-justiciable case], then he doesn't manage, simply by issuing his
utterance, to carry out the purported act.
78. 370 U.S. at 571. Justice Clark, concurring in the result, did not take issue with the
plurality's view on article 111 and suits against the government. See id. at 586-87.
79. 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968).
80. Cf. Mandel v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d 531, 174 Cal. Rptr. 841, 629 P.2d 935 (1981).
Judge Tobriner stated that "lj]ust as the courts may not reevaluate the wisdom or merits of
statutes which have secured final passage by the Legislature, the Legislature enjoys no constitutional prerogative to disregard the authority of final court judgments resolving specific
controversies within the judiciary's domain." 29 Cal. 3d at 547.
In Mandel, the state legislature refused to pay a $25,000 award of attorneys' fees in an
institutional reform case. The majority sustained the lower court's order to compel payment
out of previously appropriated general operating funds. Chief Justice Bird, in dissent, while
arguing that the legislature's actions were unconstitutional, did not support affirmance of the
lower court's order. Id. at 559-573 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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United States to "respond to its judgments,"'" a decision against the United
States will only be final in fact if the coordinate branches respect and enforce
that judgment.8 2 In a judgment against the government for damages, for
example, must Congress ipso facto surrender its article 1, section 9, power
over appropriations just because a court has awarded damages?83 To explore
this question, it is necessary both to probe into the specific legal powers of
the Congress to limit the executability of judgments, and then to examine
the limits that the Constitution places on the exercise of such power by
Congress.
III.

CONGRESSIONAL POWER AND THE INDEPENDENT
ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY

A.

The Power of Congress over Executability

One of the major compromises of the Constitutional Convention was the
creation of an independent judicial power. The judicial power, however, was
created only after agreement that it would be limited by the political
branches."' Thus, the President has the power to appoint federal judges
(with the advice and consent of the Senate)'" and Congress has control
over the removal of judges.8 6 More importantly, under the exceptions clause

81. 370 U.S. at 571.
82. This observation has led some commentators to argue that a strong concept of executability cannot be a critical element of article 111 power. See sources cited supra note 71. For
support, these commentators, such as WRIGHT & MILLER, rely on the case of Nashville,
Chattanooga & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933). In Nashville, the Court
stated that "Itlhis Court has often exerted its judicial power . . . to review judgments of the
Court of Claims, although no process issues against the Government." Id. at 263 (emphasis
added). Executability is not related to the ability to enforce by process. Enforcement of
executability against the government would consist of invalidating as unconstitutional all actions
but for good faith execution. If the other branch is to act constitutionally, it must generally
execute the judgment. See infra text accompanying notes 116-19. The significant distinction is
between the court's lack of power to actually execute judgments (changing the physical world
itself) versus the exercise of judicial power that renders a judgment executable in the sense that
the other branches may not refuse to execute (a "passive" power). Cf. Nixon v. Sirica, 487
F.2d 700, 708 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (lack of physical power to enforce judgment does not prevent
court from deciding otherwise justiciable case). Thus, although the judiciary may not be able
to "force" the Congress to abide by a judgment, it can rule that the actions of Congress are
unconstitutional when it does not execute a judgment.
83. In United States ex rel Goodrich v. Guthrie, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 284 (1855), the
Court stated that the idea that a court could "command the withdrawal of a sum or sums of
money from the Treasury of the United States, to be applied in satisfaction 6f disputed or
controverted claims against the United States . . . would seem to carry with it the most startling
considerations - nay, its unavoidable negation, unless this should be presented by some positive
and controlling command .... ." Id. at 303.
84. See P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART AND WECHSLER'S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 11-12 (2d ed. 1973).

85. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2.
86. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 3.
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of article III, Congress has wide power to control the jurisdiction of the
federal courts.8"
Congress can indirectly alter the jurisdiction of the federal courts through
the prospective repeal or limitation on the type of remedies available for
certain causes of action otherwise cognizable in article III courts. The bestknown example of this power is the Norris-LaGuardia Act,8 8 which prohibited
the federal courts from granting injunctive relief in labor actions. In Lauf
v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 89 the Supreme Court upheld the validitiy of the
legislation, and ruled that "[tihere can be no question of the power of
Congress thus to define and limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of
the United States." 9 In other words, Congress has wide latitude to control
the types of remedies granted by the inferior courts under its exception
clause power.
Although the exceptions clause does not speak directly of the Congressional
power to affect the executability of judgments, conceivably this power is
implicit in the exceptions clause given the related limitation on judicial power:
the advisory opinion doctrine. Should Congress act to render a judgment
unenforceable, the legislature would be, in effect, rendering that judgment
merely "advisory." Stated otherwise, it is at least plausible that Congressional interference with executability, if carried to the extreme of limiting
the ability of a court to provide any remedy in the particular case, represents
the exercise of Congressional power under the exceptions clause, the power
to limit the jurisdiction of article III courts. The inquiry here focuses on
whether Congress can regulate the jurisdiction of the federal courts to
retroactively deprive a court of jurisdiction after its judgment has become
(for judicial purposes) final. More directly, may the Congress unilaterally
modify a remedy granted by an article III court in a given case?
B.

The Limitations on the Power of Congress

According to the Supreme Court in McCullough v. Virginia,9' "[iut is not
within the power of a legislature to take away rights which have been once
vested by a judgment . . . . [When judicial decisions] have passed into
judgment the power of the legislature to disturb the rights created thereby
ceases." 9 As the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia has observed,
"[a] contrary general rule would subject all judicial action to superior
legislative review, a regime obviously inconsistent with due process of law
and subversive of the constitutional independence of the judicial branch of
government." 93
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

U.S. Const. art. 111, § I.
Act of March 23, 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 71, 29 U.S.C. § 107.
303 U.S. 323 (1938).
Id. at 330.
172 U.S. 102 (1898).
Id. at 123-24.
Daylo v. Administrator of Veterans' Affairs, 501 F.2d 811, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
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In the Wheeling Bridge case," the Supreme Court nevertheless created a
narrow exception to this rule. In an earlier case, the Court had held that a
bridge over an interstate waterway constituted a nuisance to a private party
whose special damages justified the award of an injunction ordering removal
of the bridge and enjoining the defendants from reconstruction or continuance. Subsequent to the litigation, Congress passed a statute that legalized
the bridge. The Supreme Court dissolved the injunction and sustained the
legislative action. 9 The Court accepted the proposition that legislation "cannot have the effect and operation to annul the judgment of the Court already
rendered, or the rights determined thereby in favor of the plaintiff." 96 The
Court nevertheless distinguished the action of Congress in "so far as it
'97
respects that portion of the decree directing the abatement of the bridge.
The Court's decision did not suggest that Congress has the power to
modify all judgments post hoc. Rather, the Wheeling exception has two
necessary components. First, if Congress is to retain discretion to modify a
judgment, the relief granted must be, as characterized by the Wheeling
Court, "executory." 98 According to the Court, in a later case interpreting
the executory aspect of the Wheeling test, "the distinction is between restraints that give protection to rights fully accrued upon facts so nearly
permanent as to be substantially impervious to change [executable remedies],
and those that involve the supervision of changing conduct or conditions
and are thus provisional and tentative [executory remedies]." 99 As opposed
to executable relief, maintenance of the injunction is dependent upon the
continuing existence of the right upon which injunctive relief was granted.
An executable judgment, on the other hand, is the creation of a legal
obligation, usually requiring future action such as the payment of damages,
that is based upon a fact situation to which the law provides a legal remedy. °°
In Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 10 the Court clarified the second
aspect of the Wheeling exception: the conditions under which Congress can
redetermine the underlying right or limit the scope of the remedy granted.
In Prudential, Congress had previously enacted legislation which authorized
states to tax out-of-state insurance companies differentially. The petitioners
argued that Congress could not validate state action that would otherwise,

94. Pennsylvania v. The Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
95. Id. at 437. While the Court dissolved the injunction, it made no mention of whether
Congress had retroactively deprived the Court of jurisdiction.
96. Id. at 431.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106, 114 (1932).
100. As the Wheeling Court noted:
[Ilf the remedy in this case had been an action at law, and a judgment rendered in
favor of the plaintiff for damages the right to these would have passed beyond the
reach of the power of Congress. It would have depended, not upon the public right
of the free navigation of the river, but upon the judgment of the Court.

59 U.S. (18 How.) at 431.
101. 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
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in the absence of such an enabling statute, violate the Commerce Clause.
The Court rejected this view, and reasoned that such a position would be
tantamount to holding that Congress could not impose a regulation which
the Court would find prohibited by the Commerce Clause. 02 According to
the Prudential Court, such a position would be inconsistent with the Wheeling
holding, in which the Court had deferred to a "congressional judgment
contradicting its own previous one."' 0 In a footnote the Court highlighted
two relevant factors in sustaining a legislative override of its decision: special
Congressional expertise in the fact-finding in a particular area (e.g., regulation of interstate commerce) and reliance by the Court on an inference
from Congressional silence for its decision.' 4 According to the Court, "Congress' explicit repudiation of the attitude inferentially attributed to it from
its silence, compels reversal of the Court's earlier pronounced view."'0 5
In areas of special competence, Congress may effectively retain power to
reverse the judgment of an article III court when the relief is executory or
contingent, and involves the supervision of future conduct dependent upon
a right whose existence was inferred from congressional silence. The institutional relationship of the judiciary and the Congress is one rationalization
for the Wheeling exception. Because an injunction prospectively determines
the rights of the parties, the Wheeling exception is arguably based upon a
principle of deference to the democratic re-determination of the scope of the
underlying rights in question. In the Wheeling situation, as argued by the
Prudential Court, the prior decision was based upon an erroneous inference
of Congressional intent. If the judiciary prohibited corrective action by the
legislature, it would interfere with the Congressional lawmaking function,
especially in the area of the regulation of interstate commerce. Rather,
if the relief granted by a court is an executable judgment, Congress ordinarily
cannot disturb the rights created thereby.
102. Id. at 422.

103. Id. at 424.
104. Id. at 425 n. 32. Some commentators view the second aspect of the Wheeling test as a
congressional redetermination of the scope of a so-called "public right." Although a useful
concept, it is difficult to clearly determine what is a public right versus a private one. Gordon
Young, for example, acknowledges the malleability of such a distinction at the margin but
argues from this reading of Wheeling. See Young, CongressionalRegulation of Federal Court's
Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 Wisc. L. REV. 1189, 1243.
Young draws the distinction between government operation in a regulatory capacity ("public")
and government involvement in a property contest ("private"), although he noted that "the
very difficult question of when the government acts in a regulatory capacity remains." Id. The
Supreme Court has used the "public rights" framework periodically. See, e.g., Northern Pipe
Line Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 458 U.S.: 50 (1982) (plurality opinion) (state
law claim involved no public right, so that Congress could riot exercise judicial authority over
matter through article I bankruptcy courts); Hodges v. Snyder, 261 U.S. 600, 603-04 (1923)
(McCulloch rule does not apply to suit brought for enforcement of public right, which may be
annulled by subsequent legislation after established by the judgment of the court) (citing
Wheeling). The Court's analysis in Prudential provides, in my opinion, a better framework
than the classificatory public rights doctrine. Similar factors would be considered in either
framework but the focus here is somewhat different.
105. 328 U.S. at 425 n.32. Justice Daniel's concurring opinion in Wheeling argued that:
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The Separation of Powers Concerns

Judicial interest in executability derives from the judiciary's need for
independence as a co-equal branch of government. In 1792, the judges noted
in Hayburn's Case that "[n]o decision of any court of the United States
can, under any circumstances, . . . agreeable to the Constitution, be liable

to a reversion, or even suspension, by the Legislature in whom no judicial
power of any kind appears to be vested."' 6 In a suit against the United
States, the Supreme Court ruled in Glidden that reliance on the good faith
of Congress to execute a judgment comported with the limitations on the
judicial power created by article III. The Court did not announce a bright
line rule that all judgments against the government must be enforced by the
coordinate branches. Thus, if jurisdiction over the United States is consistent
with the separation of powers, the competing concept of checks and balances
may legitimate, under certain circumstances, a congressional refusal to abide
by an otherwise executable judgment or a congressional modification of an
executory remedy outside the scope of the Wheeling exception.
The Supreme Court's opinion in United States v. Nixon,'07 provides the
basic framework for contemporary analysis of a clash of power between the
judiciary and a coordinate branch. 08 Examination of the relevant factors in
that case provides a useful background to analyze a conflict between the
judiciary and the legislature' ° 9 in a dispute over the execution of a judgment.
The inquiry explores the limits of the powers of both branches in the
penumbra between good versus bad faith non-execution outside of the general
rule as established by McCullough, Hayburn, and Wheeling.

In Nixon, the President asserted a broad claim of executive privilege
derived from the grant of the executive power." 0 The privilege would have
(Congress has] completely overthrown every foundation upon which the decrees of
this court, the orders of the circuit judge, and every motion purporting to be based
upon these or either of them, could rest. I am, therefore, of the opinion that each
and every motion submitted ... under color of the decrees heretofore pronounced
...should be overruled; that the injunction . . .should be dissolved ....

59 U.S. (18 How.) at 458.
106. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 413 n. 4 (1792). See also Chicago & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948) (judgments within powers vested in courts by Judiciary
Article of Constitution may not lawfully be revised, overturned or refused faith and credit by
another department of government).
107. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
108. See, e.g., Symposium on United States v. Nixon, 22 UCLA L. REV. 47 (1974).
109. While the controversy in the Chicago case has centered around both the Congress and
the President, the discussion here will focus on the legislature. The President has virtually no
authority to disregard an order of the Court. In addition to the Nixon case itself, see Kendall
v. United States, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 613 (1838) (contention that obligation imposed on
President to see laws executed implies power to forbid execution is novel and inadmissible
construction of constitution).
110. The Court acknowledged in its analysis that "[iln
the performance of assigned constitutional duties each branch of the Government must initially interpret the Constitution, and
the interpretation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others." 418 U.S.
at 703.
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frustrated the judicial process by preventing the disclosure of relevant and
probative evidence in a continuing trial. In sustaining the existence of a
presumptive article II Presidential privilege, the Supreme Court noted that
it originated from "the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned
area of constitutional duties."" ' Nevertheless, the Court went on to compel
disclosure of the subpoenaed tapes and documents.
The Court based its decision on constitutional grounds and attempted to
resolve the conflict by classifying the competing powers of the two branches:
"The generalized assertion of [article II] privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a pending criminal trial."" 2 Thus,
the Court purported to favor the "specific" need of one branch over the
"generalized" grant of constitutional autonomy and power of a second
branch.
At face value, the usefulness of the Court's test is limited because the test
is significantly malleable. Even in Nixon, the President could have argued
that under the "general versus specific" test, the President's need for article
II privilege was so vital to the daily functioning of the Executive Branch
that it outweighed a court's "general" need for evidence in trials-an interest
circumscribed by a host of evidentiary rules and privileges.
Apparently, the Nixon Court undertook a comparative inquiry measuring the degree to which each branch intruded into the essential
operations of the other and, subsequently, invalidated the more intrusive
action." 3' The Court recognized the legitimacy of the need for executive
privilege "to the extent this interest [in confidentiality] relates to the effective
discharge of a President's powers." '"1 4 The Court, however, argued that an
absolute Presidential privilege, undifferentiated from any essential need of
the Executive, would "gravely impair the role of the courts under Art.
III."" 5 The President's claim was "general" in the sense that it applied to
non-military and non-diplomatic matters. Once the Court focused on the
potential scope of the privilege, it naturally became concerned with the
degree to which such a "general" privilege might hamper the operation of
S111.
Id. at 705.
112. Id. at 713 (emphasis added).
113. See Nagel, Separation of Powers and the Scope of Federal Equitable Remedies, 30

L. REV. 661, 700-01 (1978):
Nixon, then, is a refined application of all four of the traditional judicial standards
for separation of powers. It adopts the hydraulic assumption that the power of
each branch is delimited by the function of the competing branch. The "essentialness" of the function is relevant as a comparative measure of the degree of intrusion
into each branch's function, considered in the abstract. The distinction between
"internal" and "external" uses of power is restated as a more general inquiry into
the comparative degree of intrusion into the actual operations of each branch. The
Jackson formulation [in the Steel Seizure Case, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (concurring opinion)] is followed insofar as it suggests that the authority of one branch
should not be invalidated unless there is an actual conflict with another branch,
and then only to the minimum extent necessary to resolve the conflict.
114. 418 U.S. at 711.

STAN.

115. Id. at 707.
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the courts. Thus, the Court argued that to sustain such a privilege would
effectively "cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely
impair the function of the courts."'1 6
The general rule of Hayburn and McCullough and the judiciary's interest
in executability as articulated in Gordon and Glidden, for example, leads to
the presumption that in a conflict between the branches over the execution
of a judgment, Congress must counterpose a more specific institutional
interest than the President did in Nixon. In other words, Congress cannot,
consistent with the separation of powers, assert its "general" need to control
the appropriations power in contravention of a final court order-a more
compelling institutional interest is required.
In a conflict over executability, the Court would examine the extent to
which sustaining executability would interfere with the effective discharge of
the constitutional obligations of Congress. On the other hand, the Court
would consider its own need to secure execution of its judgments in order
to preserve the role and function of the courts in a justice system commited
to the due process of law. As the Supreme Court noted in the 1980 case of
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians," 7 if Congress simply refused to
give effect to a judgment, such "legislative review of a judicial decision
would interfere with the independent functions of the judiciary."" 8 The
Nixon analysis suggests that only under unusual and compelling circumstances would congressional action refusing to execute a judgment be constitutional.
Although a court may have the power to declare a congressional refusal
to execute a violation of the separation of powers, the judiciary lacks real
power to enforce its decrees because Congress has the political power to
refuse to execute, although it theoretically may lack the constitutional authority to do so. But, as Henry Hart noted, "[if Congress wants to frustrate
the judicial check, our constitutional tradition requires that it be made to
say so unmistakably, so that the people will understand and the political
check can operate.""19 The limit to the judicial response is the amenability
of the other branches to yield to a court's declaration of law. When the
coordinate branches refuse to abide by the judiciary's pronouncement, the
region of conflict becomes politics.
IV.

CHICAGO REDUX: THE EXECUTABILITY OF THE CONSENT DECREE

The history of the Chicago case reveals a consistent pattern of Presidential
and Congressional action that impairs the executability of a final judicial
decree. Albeit in the absence of any independent judicial findings of violation
116. Id.at 712.
117. 448 U.S. 371 (1980).

118. Id. at 391-92.
119. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An
Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HAv. L. REv. 1362, 1399 (1953); cf. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. (4
Otto) 113, 134 (1877) (to protect against abuses by legislatures that courts unable to control,
the people must resort to polls).

19851

EXECUTABILITY

of law or determination of disputed fact, a consent decree does resolve the
case or controversy presented to the court. 20 As the Supreme Court has
recognized, "[i]t is a judicial function and an exercise of the judicial power
to render a judgment on consent. A judgment upon consent is a 'judicial
act.' . . . [I]t adjudicates the plaintiff's right of recovery and the extent of
it, both of which are essential elements of the judgment."' 2' 1 As an exercise
of judicial power, a consent decree is, in effect, a judgment to the full extent
22
of the obligation created. 1
According to the analysis developed in Parts II and III of this Article,
Congress may limit the execution of a judgment only if Congress redefines
the right-inferred from its silence-upon which executory relief was dependent in an area of particular legislative competence or, under the separation of powers framework of Nixon, if Congress can assert an institutional
more "specific" need than the judiciary's interest in executability.
The concerns expressed by the Supreme Court in McCullough'"-the protection of settled expectations and the private rights created by a judgmentwould be implicated by a revision of the decree by the Congress. With the
entry of the decree, the Board acquired contract/judgment rights in the
decree. Moreover, the federal government has assumed the responsibility of
vindicating the rights of the students in the Chicago school system. In the
desegregation context, as the Court noted in Brown II, "at stake is the
personal interest of [students] in admission to public schools as soon as
practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis."' 24 In effect, the Department of
Justice, the plaintiff in Chicago, was authorized to sue as a surrogate for
individuals asserting their private rights. Indeed, in this case, the district
court both denied intervention to such groups as the NAACP and the
120. In Chicago, 88 F.R.D. 679 (N.D. I1. 1981), the court stated, "Here the Consent Decree
• . . has been entered without the need to establish that the Board's predecessors in office have
violated the Constitution." Id. at 681 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). At least in
regard to violation of federal laws, "the long-standing rule is that a district court has power
to enter a consent decree without first determining that a statutory violation has occurred."
Citizens for a Better Env't v. Gorsuch, 718 F.2d 1117, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied 104
S. Ct. 2668 (1984). "Finally, in public law litigation, where compliance depends in part upon
public acceptance and the least possible acrimony between the parties, settlement is particularly
welcome for it signifies cooperation between the parties." Chicago, 88 F.R.D. 679, 681 (N.D.
I1. 1981) (quoting initial memorandum of the United States requesting entry of the consent
decree).
121. In Pope v. United States, 323 U.S.
(1944), the Court stated that "[i]t is likewise a
judicial act to give judgment on a legal obligation which the court finds to be established by
stipulated facts . . . or when the defendant is in default." Id. at 12 (citations omitted) (emphasis
added).
122. See, e.g., United States v. ITT Continental Baking Co., 420 U.S. 223, 236 n. 10 (1975)
(consent decrees have attributes of contracts and judicial decrees); Chicago, No. 80C 5124, slip
op. at 2 (N.D. Il1. Oct. 15, 1985) (consent decree is enforceable decree and order of court)
(footnote omitted).
123. 172 U.S. 102 (1898).
124. Brown v. Board of Educ. (Brown 11), 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). The district court's
most recent opinion expressed the hope that "the government will rekindle its lost zeal for
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Mexican American Legal Defense and Education Fund (MALDEF)I25 and
dismissed a continuing private action alleging unconstitutional segregation
12 6
in the Chicago school system because of the government's suit. Consequently, the government's actions in the Chicago case should be scrutinized
closely in order to protect both the rights of the Board of Education and
the interests of the students in the Chicago school system as represented by
the government.
The Chicago case does not satisfy the requirements of the Wheeling
exception, which justifies a congressional modification of an executory judgment. Although the consent decree contemplates future action on behalf of
the government, the "substantial obligation" of the United States became
fixed with the approval of the decree. The existence of the obligation itself
is an executable judgment. The scope of the legal obligation embodied
in the consent decree is the result of a judicial act determined by the
examination of the relevant negotiations and testimony leading to approval
of the decree. Additionally, unlike the issuance of an injuction, the government, by entering into the consent decree, has submitted itself to the supervision of the judiciary. Therefore, according to the Wheeling test, Congress
cannot extinguish-in law or in effect-the obligations of the government
under the decree. '27
For Congress to interfere with the execution of a judgment outside of the
Wheeling exception, it must present an exercise of power protecting a specific
need essential to that branch's constitutionally assigned duties. Although
control over appropriations is one of the national legislature's preeminent
powers,'12 fulfilling the obligation created under the decree would not eviscerate Congress' institutionally specific need to control federal expenditures.
The amount at stake in the last appeal to the Seventh Circuit was $28 million,
representing those whom it sought to protect in the first place when it iled this suit: Chicago's
school children who are entitled to receive a quality and desegregated education." Chicago,
Oct. 15, 1985).
No. 80C 5124, slip op. at 287 (N.D. Ill.
1981).
125. Chicago, 88 F.R.D. 679 (N.D. Ill.
1983).
126. Johnson v. Board of Educ., 567 F. Supp. 290 (N.D. Ill.
127. Cf. Michaelson v. United States, St. P., M. & 0. Ry.; 266 U.S. 42, 66 (924) (attributes,
such as contempt power, inherent in judicial power and inseparable from it, cannot be abrogated
or rendered "practically inoperative"); Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283, 294 (1901) (result
directly restricted by constitution cannot be accomplished indirectly by legislation).
In the conte::t of the Chicago case, the district court interpreted the most recent Seventh
Circuit opinion as precluding "the court from finding that failure to lobby or reprogram
amounts [to fund the decree] amounts to bad faith per se, or that the mere act of creating
general policy which effectively limits the funds available to the Board amounts to bad faith
Oct. 15, 1985). This does not mean,
...." Chicago, No. 80C 5124, slip op. at 11 (N.D. Ill.
however, that Congress or the President has the authority to render the decree itself practically
inoperative. The important consideration for the court is the ultimate effect of congressional
action upon the decree. While failure to appropriate may not be a per se violation, refusing to
implement the decree at all would constitute, in effect, a legislative override of the court order,
and thus would violate the separation of powers.
128. See, e.g., Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (II How.) 272, 291 (1850) (appropriation by
Congress necessary to draw money from Treasury).
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roughly equivalent to .003% of the United States annual budget. 29 Additionally, the statute providing for payment of judgments against the United
States, which provided for a limit of only $100,000 at the time of Glidden
in 1962, currently provides no ceiling for the payment of judgments against
the United States, thus, evincing Congressional intent to pay judgments as
a matter of course. 30 As President Lincoln observed upon establishing the
Court of Claims, it is "as much the duty of Government to render prompt
justice against itself, in favor of citizens, as it is to adminster the same
between private litigants."'' Congress' generalized assertion of the power
of appropriations, undifferentiated from any specific institutional need should
yield to the judiciary's interest in the executability of its judgments.
More than five years after entry of the consent decree, the political
branches have pursued a course of action that impairs the executability of
a final judicial order without interposing an especially significant need to
refuse to execute in the Chicago case. Through their actions, the President
and the Congress may have interfered with the role and function of the
federal courts and may have violated the constitutional separation of powers.
CONCLUSION

The executability of article III judgments provides for the independence
of the sovereign power vested in the judiciary as a co-equal branch of
government. Executability as a concept captures the inherent tension within
article III as both a grant and a limitation of power. When judicial intervention will not yield an executable judgment, an article III court is disempowered from expressing its view on the subject matter. Executability, as
co-extensive with the advisory opinion doctrine, thus confines the federal
courts to a limited role in the constitutional order. To the contrary, the
constitutional commitment to the independent role of the judiciary implies
that another branch of the government cannot arbitrarily revise the judgments
of article III courts. Thus, executability also expresses the judiciary's interest
in the execution of a judgment once rendered. In the context of the Chicago
case, the doctrine of executability provides a fruitful analytic framework
that exposes many of the deeper issues involved in this continuing constitutional conflict.
129. Brief of Board of Education of the City of Chicago, No. 84-2405 at 41, Chicago, 744
F.2d 1300 (7th Cir. 1984).
130. 31 U.S.C. §1304 (1982).
131. State of the Union Message of 1861, CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess., app. 2 (1862),
quoted in United States v. Mitchell, 103 S.Ct. 2961, 2966 (1983).

